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HE MAGNITUDE of the United States balance-
of-payments deficit and concern about the effective
operation of the international monetary system domi-
nated thinking about U.S. payments problems and
policies in 1971. Dollar outflows had long been critical
to the functioning of the Bretton Woods system, but
the continuous accumulation of dollars by foreigners,
the relative fixity of exchange rates, and effectively
integrated money and capital markets led many to
seek reform of the international monetary system dur-
ing 1971. The objective of most proposed reforms was
to diminish the importance of the dollar in the sys-
tem’s operation and to promote a more effective means
of adjusting countries’ external payments positions,
including that of the United States.
For years, dollar deficits had been beneficial to both
U.S. and foreign residents. Foreigners used the dollars
to finance trade imbalances and to minimize costs of
holding liquid transactions balances in several cur-
rencies. Countries chose to use dollars to meet their
exchange rate stability obligations as members of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). New York
money and capital markets served as the primary
source of funds (dollars) for American and foreign
enterprises and dollars played a critical role in the
formation and development of an important interbank
market for funds — the Eurodollar market.
As U.S. payments deficits persisted, the supply of
dollars in the hands of foreign residents became more
than was necessary for minimal foreign private liquid-
ity purposes and for exchange into American goods
and financial instruments. The willingness of private
foreigners to hold additional dollar deposits (or dollar
claims) above minimum levels declined after the mid-
1960s when the potential dollar claims exceeded the
available gold stock. Evidence of the decline in de-
mand for dollars was indicated by their sale to central
banks by private foreigners. It was the continuing
dollar deficits plus the decline in the willingness of
foreigners to hold dollar balances that finally hindered
effective operation of the international monetary sys-
tem in 1971.
In May, official foreigners indicated their unwill-
ingness to accumulate more dollars. On August 15 the
United States indicated it was no longer willing to
tolerate the projected balance-of-payments deficits. It
suspended convertibility of dollars into gold, imposed
an import surcharge, and announced its intention to
seek a realignment of parity rates and multinational
cooperation on reform of the international monetary
system.
Reactions to the Deficit
Reactions to the U.S. payments deficit in 1971 were
divided into two timne periods by the President’s an-
nouncement of August 15.
Recent marked reserve accumulation among in-
dustrial countries other than the United States began
in 1970. Little importance was attached to the fact at
that time. Many nations had seen some decline in the
foreign exchange component of their reserves from
preceding ears with the flow of short-term dollars
from Europe to the United States. The reserve in-
flows in 1970 returned the reserve balances to their
previous levels, but as the U.S. deficit increased
in 1971. reserve accumulation became. a source of
concern.
In early April, all major currencies began to appre-
ciate against the dollar in the forward exchange mar-
kets because of the large interest— rate differentials
between this country and abroad, and perhaps, in
anticipation of an impending fonnal decline in the
relative value of the dollar. Many industrial countries
had difficulty in restraining domestic inflation while
meeting their exchange-rate stability responsibilities
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under the rules of the IMF.’ Swap lines with Belgium,
the Netherlands, Switzerland and Germany were acti-
vated in an attempt to reduce declines in U.S. reserve
assets. Further action by the United Statesto slow the
dollar outflow involved the renewed sale by the Ex-
port-Import Bank and the U.S. Treasury of special
three-month certificates of indebtedness to foreign
branches and agencies of U.S. banks. Several foreign
central banks lowered their discount rates in late
March and April in order to narrow, or even reverse,
the interest arbitrage spreads which had been in
favor of domestic currencies in the first quarter.
The Eurodollar market remained calm in the first
quarter of 1971 as it had throughout 1970. Eurodollar
rates declined as many Eurodollar borrowings were
repaid, particularly by U.S. banks, and rates fell well
below most European interest rates. In contrast to
normal times of 1970 and early 1971,when the Euro-
dollar market served as an international intermediary
both for depositors seeking high rates of return on
their money balances and for borrowers seeking lower
cost credit than they could obtain at home, the Euro-
dollar market took on an increasingly speculative tone
in the second quarter of 1971. As exchange rate un-
certainties increased and banks and businesses bor-
rowed funds in the Eurodollar market for conversion
into domestic currencies, the rate rose rapidly. In
‘Under rules of the IMF, countries were responsible for
limiting exchange-rate fluctuation to one percent on either
side of parity throughout niost of 1971. Alter December 18
the range of permissable exchange-rate fluctuation was in-
creased to 2¼percent on either side of parity for most
countries.
April and early May the three-
month rate climbed to about 7.5
percent and overnight rates on
individual days reached 45 per-
cent or more. In late May and
June the rate receded, but in
late July and August the three-
month rate rose again to nearly
a 9 percent level with the over-
night rate soaring to 200 per-
cent on the last day of August.
The country most sensitive to
the U.S. deficit and international
financial conditions in the first
half of the year was Germany.
Faced with a particularly large
inflow of dollars, substantial do-
mestic inflation, and interest
rates well above the Eurodollar
money market rates, the Bundes-
bank suspended its foreign exchange operations in
the wake of a $1 billlon inflow over May 3-4, and an
additional $1 billion inflow in the first forty minutes of
trading on the morning of May 5. The Frankfurt
market reopened on May 10 with an announcement
by the Bundesbank that trading limits for the mark
would be suspended temporarily, although the official
parity was to remain unchanged. This action per-
nutted the German government to continue its restric-
tive stabilization policies. It chose to supplement the
action by announcing on June 2 an increase in banks’
minimum reserve requirements of 15 percent across
the board, while the requirements against foreign
liabilities were raised to twice the level of the new
domestic requirements.
Shortly after the German decision, speculative pres-
sures shifted to other “strong” national currencies. The
Netherlands subsequently permitted the guilder to
fluctuate and Belgium strengthened its two exchange
rate system — one official and one financial — and per-
initted the latter to appreciate. Switzerland and
Austria raised their parities by 7,07 and 5.05 percent,
respectively.
The release of the second quarter U.S. balance-of-
payments data indicated a marked deterioration in
the U.S. external position, and when combined with
the behavior of fluctuating exchange rates in July and
August, offered additional evidence that the dollar
might need to be devalued. U.S. reserve assets had
diminished to about $12.1 billion in mid-August from
$14.6 billion at the beginning of the year, and nearly
45 percent of the $2.5 billion decline came in early
Table I
Official Reserves of Selected Industrial Countries, 1968-71
tBiIIlonn of Da~iors~ End of Pc.od)
1971
Septer~- Dt.ccm.
~oonfry 1Q68 1969 1970 Mo-h .n,nc ber berfl
United States 515.7 $1 7,0 $145 514.3 513.5 512.1 $13.2
United Kingdom 2.4 25 28 3.3 36 5.0 66
Belgium 7.2 24 2.8 3.! 32 3.4 35
France 4.2 3.8 50 5.5 5 7 73 8.2
Italy 5.3 ~0 5.4 6.0 6.! 67 68
Netheriands 25 25 37 35 35 36 3.8
West Garmony 9.9 71 13.6 lit 6.7 17.0 18.4
canada 3.0 Dl 47 48 4.9 56 5.7
Japan 29 17 48 59 78 34 154
Sweden B .1 8. 9 I 0 1 0 .1
Swifze’iond 4.3 44 5.1 4.6 5.1 65 70
irtl,. nP.r;,T..~i ~I ~ . .~
1. I..s— ..: ~ u.’5..ru.. I’
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August. Although the United States again drew heav-
ily on its swap lines of credit, private and public
pressures to convert dollars into other currencies and
ultimately U.S. reserve assets became overwhelming.2
The United States suspended convertibility of the
dollar into gold on August 15.
In addition to the suspension of dollar convertibility
and a program designed to reduce unemployment
and domestic price-wage pressures, the President’s
program of August 15 imposed an additional tax (sur-
charge) of 10 percent on goods imported into the
United States. The apparent purpose of the surtax
was to set the stage for useful international negotia-
tions to achieve a realigmuient of currencies and a
better access to foreign markets for American pro-
ducers. As a related measure, the President ordered
a 10 percent reduction in foreign aid.
TaMe U
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The President Economic Report describes the im-
port surcharge as applying only to “goods on which
duties had been reduced under reciprocal trade agree-
ments, and in no case ...was it to raise a duty be-
yond the statutory rate. Where it was limited by the
statntory ceiling, the surcharge was less than 10 per-
cent. On automobiles, in particular, the tax amounted
onlyto 6.5 percent. Furthermore, all imports subject to
mandatory quantitative restrictions were exempt from
the new tax. Such goods included petroleum, sugar,
2
Federal Reserve swap lines with foreign central banks and
the Bank for International Settlements were drawn on in the
amount of $3,565 million between January 1 and August 13.
During the same period $1,330 nuillion in current and pre-
vious drawings were repaid by misc of foreign currency
balances and Special Drawing Rights, through U.S. horrow-
ing from the International Monetary Fund, and thrommgh the
sale of special securities to foreign official institutions. On
August 15 there was a total of $3,045 million of swap in-
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meat and dairy products, certain other agricultural
products, and cotton textiles covered by the Long-
Term Textile Agreement. The surcharge affected about
one-half of U.S. impofts.’~ Subsequent announce-
ments confined the Job Development Tax Credit to
domesucally produced machinery and equipment as
long as the import surcharge remained in effect.
Despite the price freeze on domestically produced
items, prices of imported goods were allowed to rise
by the full amount of the additional duty imposed.
Prices of items assembled or produced in the United
States with foreign components would also be allowed
to rise by the amount of the additional duty levied on
the foreign conuponents. The President also removed
the 7 percent excise tax on autos which was applica-
ble to imported as well as domestic cars.
The European exchange markets were closed for a
week following the President’s announcement. When
the markets reopened, no major industrial country
except France tried to maintain the value of its cur-
rency against the dollar within the one percent upper
limit of its parity rate. In France, the foreign exchange
market was separated into a muarket for dollars re-
ceived as a result of international trade, in which the
French continued to intervene to maintain the parity
value, and a “financial franc” nuarket in which all
other exchanges were transacted. Although severe re-
strictions were inuposed on inflows of funds through
the financial franc market, the exchange rate was
allowed to find its own level.
The Japanese government initially tried to purchase
all dollars offered at the ceiling rate, but in face of a
$4.4 billion inflo\v in August, it was later forced to
suspend the rate and limit intervention so as to permit
about a 5 percent rise relative to the dollar in the
subsequent nuonth. Other administrative actions to
assist in limiting the appreciation of the yen relative
to the dollar over the remainder of the year included
placement of a ceiling on all nonresident free yen
deposits that Japanese commercial banks might re-
ceive, proluhition of prepayment of trade bills to Ja-
panese exporters, and a request that banks not in-
crease their Eurodollar borrowing. Many of these ex-
change controls were relaxed early in 1972.
Many other countries also imposed restrictions on
foreign exchange transactions, hut still permitted the
3
Economic Report of the Pte.sident, 1972, p. 148.
value of their currencies to fluctuate relative to the
dollar. From time to time central banks intervened
in markets to limit the pace at which their currencies
appreciated relative to the dollar, By early Dccciii-
ber, it was clear that a set of regulated exchange rates
between foreign currencies and dollars had emerged
which was substantially different than at the begin-
ning of the year. Many of the new exchange rates
were formalized shortly after the Smithsonian agree-
nucnt of December 18 by the declaration of temporary
“central values,” and the announcement by the United
States of its willingness to raise the dollar price of gold
by 8.57 percent and remove the import surcharge.
Simultaneously, muost countries agreed to permit ex-
change-rate fluctuations within a 2.25 percent range
on each side of the central value.~
4
Numnerous alternatives were availahle to the United States
in seeking a realignment of exchange rates alter August 15.
The desire to realign exchange rate patterns could have been
achieved by: (I) pennitting exchange rates to float upward
to their new and higher levels vis-à-vis the dollar; (2)
devaluation of the dollar against other currencies; (3) re-
valuation of other currencies against the dollar while leavin
the value of the gold content of the dollar unchanged; an
(4) a combination of devaluatiqn of the dollar with respect
to gold and a change in the exchange rates of other nations
vip-fl-vip the dollar and each othcm. In the end, the latter
path was chosen.
One of the considerations in determining the extent of
exchange-rate realignment was the state of the U.S. balance
of payments. The Administration concluded that the size of
the required correction would be an exchange rate realign-
ment necessary to bring a turnaround of $13 billion. Their
calculations were as follows:
1. Under conditions of reasonably full employment in
both the United States and other major trading countries,
the U.S. deficit on curient account (excluding U.S. Coy-
ermnent grants) for 1972 was projected to he $4 billion
on the basis of the exchange rates and other trading con-
ditions in effect in April 1971.
2. The annt~aloutflow for Government grants and credits
plus private long-term capital flows from the United States
to countries other than Western European natiomus, Canada,
and Japan was estimated at $6 billion, or just over one-half
of one percent of the U.S. gross natiotial product. The
average anmtal outflow for these purposes during the 5-
year period from 1967 thrtmgh 1971 was ahottt $5½billion.
3. A secmmre payments position would require that this
estimated $6-billion capital cmutflow he covered by a surplus
on current account. Since the projected “full-enuploynient”
current account for 1972 was in deficit by $4 billion,
achieving a surplus of $6 billion required an inuprovement
of $10 billion in the U.5. current account.
4. Two other factors caused additions to this basic esti—
unite. The first was an allowance tf $1 billion a year to
cover a persistent outflow, which the data collection net-
work does not capture. This outflow, which is shown as
“e and omissions” or unidentified transactions in the
accounts, fluctuates from year to year, but it has been pon-
sistently negative since 1960. the average level being
around $1 billion. The second factor ~vas an allowance of
$2 billion to pm-ovide the prospect of a small srmrphss on
basic balance, to cover persistent short-ternu capital out-
flows or to serve as a margin of safety against errors in the
imnderlying assumptions and calculations. With the addition
of these two factors, the turnaround reqmeired for the
United States to achieve a secure position was estimated
to be $13 billion. [Economic Report of the President, 1972,
pp. 154-155.1
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The effective devaluation of the dollar based on the
new central rates for the 14 countries indicated in
Table III was 10.35 percent on a trade-weighted
APRIL 1972
average basis. About two thirds of the total trade
of the United States is conducted with these
countries. Against all currencies that revalued rela-
tive to the dollar, the effective devaluation was
about 9.7 percent on a trade-weighted basis. These
countries account for about 80 percent of total U.S.
trade. Finally, against all currencies of the world, in-
cluding those which did not change their exchange
rate with the dollar as well as those who did — such
as Israel, Ghana, South Africa, and Yugoslavia — the
effective dollar devaluation on a trade-weighted basis
was about 7.5 percent. By December 31, currencies of
the 14 countries in the table had appreciated only
9.05 percent relative to the dollar on a trade-weighted
basis.
Balance of Payments Analysis
On a yearly basis the United States balance of pay-
ments was in deficit by $22 billion on a liquidity
basi and $29.8 bilhon on an official settlements basis
in 1971 compared to deficit of $3.8 billion and $9.8
billion respectively in 1970. The liquidity deficit
averaged $3.4 billion from 1965 to 1969 and $2.8 bil-
lion fiom 1960 to 1964. The official settlements balance
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$2.2 billion from 1960 to 1964. Much of the deteriora-
tion of the balaimces in 1971 over 1970 reflected un-
certainties associated with interest-rate differentials,
and anticipated changes in the par value of the dollar
and other exchange rates. However, there were sub-
stantial adverse movements on
trade and long-term capital ac-
counts as well,
The trade account, which is
an important component of the
current account, declined from
a surplus of $6.8 bfflion in 1964
to a deficit of $2.9 billion in
1971. Strikes had a particularly
adverse effect on the balance in
1971, but deterioration can more
generally be attributed to (1)
the gradually increasing over-
valuation of the dollar relative
to other currencies, and (2) the
relative income, output, and
price trends in Europe and the
United States. The effect of in-
come, output, and price move-
ments on the trade balance is
discussed below.
As a general rule, movements
of U.S. nonagricultural exports
are related to income and out-
put movements in other indus-
trial nations. The accompanying
chart shows that the rate of ex-
pansion in foreign industrialpro-
duction varied between five and
ten percent over the decade, and
that fluctuations in the rate of
expansion resulted in nearly si-
multaneous and wider fluctua-
tions in U.S. export growth. The
increase in the rate of expansion
in foreign industrial production
in 1967 and 1968 was followed
by an acceleration in U.S. export
growth, and a subsequent de-
cline in the rate of foreign in-
dustrial production in 1970-71
by a deceleration in U.S. export
growth.
Movements in U.S. imports
are related to movements in U.S.
GNP. Variations in GNP growth
over the decade were accompanied by simultaneous,
but wider, fluctuations in import growth. However,
this explanation does not appear to be as valid in
analyzing the import performance of 1970 and 1971
as in earlier years.
Tablo iv
U.S. Balance of Payments, 1960-71
I Billions of dollarsI
19o0 64 965.69
Typo at nror.soc’ion average overage 1968 1969 1970 1971
Morchanaine trade balance $54 528 50.6 507 S 2’ 5 29
Exports 21.7 31.3 33.6 365 42.0 42.8
lmportn 16.2 28.5 33.0 35.8 39.9 45.6
Military transactions, net 2 ‘ 2 9 S. I 3.3 3 42 9
Balance on investment ,ncame 3 9 5 8 62 6 C 62 8C
U.S. investment abroad 5 1 8.6 9.2 10 5 11.4 .2.7
Foreign inventmen’ i, the
United States .2 2 83 0 4.6 5.2 4.8
Balance an other se’v,cos m.0 1.2 .2 .3 1 2 1 5
BALANCE ON GOODS AND SERVICES
3
59 4 4 2.5 2 C 3.6 07
Private remittances and government
pensions .7 1 1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5
BALANcE ON GOODS, SERVIcES
AND REMITTANCES 5.2 33 ~.3 7 22 33
Government Grants .8 1 8 1.7 1 6 1 7 2.0
BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT 33 1 5 .4 9 .4 2 8
Batance on direct private investn’enes 1 8 3.0 2.9 2 4 3.5 4.7
U S. direct investment abroad 1.8 3 3 3.2 3.3 4 2 45
Foreign direct investment in the
United States .1 .3 .3 8 1.0 0.2
Balance an other long.tcrm
capital flown
t
22 .6 1.9 .4 II 1.8
BALANCE ON CURRENT ACCOUNT
AND LONG.TERM CAPITAL 7 22 1.3 2 9 3.0 9.3
Satance on nanliquid short term
private capital flows 11 2 .2 .6 5 2.5
Errors and unrecordea transactions 1.0 1.0 .5 2.6 1.1 ID 9
Allocations at speclat drawing rights — - - . .——. .9 .7
NET LIQUID? BALANCE 28 34 1.6 61 38 220
Transactions in U.S. liquid uhort term
assets, net .1 1 .6 I .2 1.1
Trannactians in U.S. i-quid liabilities to
other than tareign official agencies,
net 8 3.3 3.8 8.7 6.2 6.7
OFFIcIAL RESERVE TRANSACTIONS
BALANCE 22 1.6 27 9.8 29.P
Financed by change in.
Nonliquid U.S. Government and
U.S. bank ‘‘abilities to to eign
official agennjes’ 1 .1 23 1 1.’ .3 .2
Liquid liabihtes ta larcign
affictat agencus 1.1 - .6 3 1 .5 /6 276
U.S. aff,cia~ reserve asnets• net 1.0 I i .9 - 1.2 2 5 2.3
-l lied...:i,,it,:e-r. 1.~ v—: nici.t ii”. ‘i-’i’’.3-Lt s.
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Determinants of U.S. Foreign Trade Position
C]rn’ge ten”, Co,r~npardrr5Period Yea, Earlir,
Semi-Aetonni Data
Percent Changes in U.S. Ilonagricultural Exports
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Price as well as income movements determine the
pattern of trade flows. Until late 1969 prices of goods
exported from the United States rose substantially
faster than those exported by the United States’ com-
petitors. However in 1970 and 1971, export prices of
competitors rose 8.4 percent compared to 2.4 percent
for U.S. goods, thereby improving the U.S. relative
export position. Much of the relative improvement
was apparently due to rapid domestic inflation in
Europe (indicated by a rapid rise in costs per unit of
production) which spilled over into the export sectors
in 1970 and 1971,~
10
~Although both price and income movements proved more
favorable to the United States in 1970 and 1971 than in
previous years, much of the improvement can be attributed
solely to the different eyclical positions of the United States
and most European nations, and represents no fundamental
improvement in the U.S. trade position. Both the OECD
and the Federal Reserve Board have besiun work to develop
data on “cyclically adjusted” trade balances. The OECI)
preliminary cyclical adjustment estimates indicate that the
observed U-S. surplus of $2.2 billion on current transactions
(excluding Governments grants) in 1970 was -$2.4 billion
higher than it would have been under “normal” conditions
(defined as a condition of normal high employment in all
OECD countries). U.S. calculations indicate a 1970 adjusU
ntent for cyclical and other special factors of $2.8 billion, or
an adjusted deficit of $0.6 billion. A similar adjustment for
Table V
U S Re at ye Cost and Puce Positjon 1961 1971
Unnt Ye ut E Llnrted Stale, Conspet for,
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\. major component of the outflow of private capital
in the l960s has been pri ate U.S. direct capital in-
vestment abroad. In th earls l960s the outflow aver
aged $1.8 billion compaied to $3.3 billion from 1965to
1969. It reiched $4.4 and $4.5 billion in 1970 and 1971
respectively. This outflow has be nmore than offs t
in most years hs income on U.S. investment abroad
(included in the current account) and by foieign di
rect investments in the United States. The flow of
foreign direct investment to the United States in-
creased markedly in 1969 and 1970 when cyclical
conditions were favorable but diminished to a deficit
of $0.2 billion in 1971.
th fir t thrc s qu ter of 1971 indic tes the underl) ing tr- de
balance was much ie 5 fax orible thin th ohs ried figure of
$0.1 billion. 1,co, omit’ Report of Hi Pr’sid nt, 1.9 2p .1~3.
20
.10
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Private financial short-termn capital flows generally
respond to the stocks of assets held by U.S. and for-
eign residents as well as changes in those stocks, and
the level of and changes in interest-rate differentials.
In periods of greater than normal uncertainty, such as
existed in part of 1971, speculative transactions may
obscure these fundamental economic relationships.
The major change in financial capital flows in 1971
was an increase in certain nonliquid short-term pri-
vate capital outflows (loans by banks and nonbanks
to finance foreign trade) by $2.0 billion to $2.5 billion
from an average outflow of $0.5 billion in 1970. Errors
and omissions increased to a $10.9 billion deficit in
1971 from a $1.1 billion deficit in 1970. A smnall por-
tion of these errors and omissions (about $1 billion)
represents errors in data collection and reporting. The
remainder of the errors and omissions is probably
highly interest-rate sensitive and reflects speculative
short-term capital flows not captured by normal re-
porting procedures.
The net liquidity balance deteriorated in 1971 be-
cause of adverse movements on trade account, long-
term private capital, and errors and omissions. The
deficit was $22 billion in 1971. compared to deficits
of $3.8 billion in 1970 and $6.1 billion in 1969.
The change in accounting procedures made in mid-
1971, wInch included liquid short-term assets along
with liquid liabilities to other than foreign official
agencies as a financing item of the net liquidity bal-
ance, decreased the net liquidity deficit by $1.1 billion
in 1971, while increasing it $th2 billion in 1970. The
accounting change which included nonliquid U.S.
Government and long-term U.S. bank liabilities to
foreign official agencies as financing items of the liq-
uidity balance decreased the liquidity deficit by a bil-
lion dollars or less in each of the last three years.
The official settlements balance increased to a $29.8
billion deficit in 1971 from a $9.8 billion deficit in 1970
and a $2.7 billion surplus in 1969. The shift from sur-
plus to deficit in the past txvo years reflected net out-
flows of liquid private capital in addition to the ad-
verse movements on trade account, long-term private
capital, and errors and omissions which contributed
to the liquidity deficit, These liquid dollar movements
shifted from inflows of $3.2 billion and $8.8 billion in
1968 and 1969, respectively, to outflows of $6.0 billion
and $7.8 billion in 1970 and 1971, respectively. Much
of the outflow was associated with repayment of Euro-
dollar liabilities of U.S. banks to their foreign branches
and agencies.
The official settlements balance was financed in
1971. by a reduction in reserve assets of $2.3 billion
and a net increase of liquid and certain nouliquid
liabilities to foreign official agencies of $27.4 billion.
Most of the reduction in reserve assets occurred be-
fore August 15.
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